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of the General Debate of the Nineteenth

General Assembly, Ambassador Stevenson sought to put in broader
perspective the specific constitutional issues underlying the current
financial crisis of the United Nations. "The issue," Mr. Stevenson said,
"is in essence whether or not we intend to preserve the effective capacity
of this Organization to keep the peace. It is whether to continue the difficult but practical and hopeful process of realizing in action the potential
of the Charter for growth through collective responsibility, or turn
toward a weaker concept and a different system."1
In support of his analysis, Mr. Stevenson invoked a passage from the
famous "last will and testament" of Dag Hammarskjold, the Introduction to the Secretary-General's Annual Report to the General Assembly
on the Work of the Organization, June 16, 1960-June 15, 1961. After
referring to "different concepts of the United Nations, the character of
the Organization, its authority and its structure," Mr. Hammarskjold had
gone on to describe those different concepts in the following terms:
On the one side, it has in various ways become clear that certain
members conceive of the Organization as a static conference
' The first of a three-part article. The other two parts will appear in volume 33 of
the University of Chicago Law Review and will focus respectively on the policies for
administering peace-keeping operations and on alternative means of financing such
operations. The first part concentrates on the constitutional basis for peace-keeping.
t Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Visiting Research Scholar, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1964-65.
1 U.N. GFN. Ass. OFF. REc. 19th Sess., Plenary 1323 (A/PV.1323), at 54-55 (1965).
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machinery for resolving conflicts of interests and ideologies with
a view to peaceful coexistence, within the Charter, to be served
by a Secretariat which is to be regarded not as fully internationalized but as representing within its ranks those very interests
and ideologies.
Other members have made it clear that they conceive of the Organization primarily as a dynamic instrument of Governments
through which they, jointly and for the same purpose, should
seek such reconciliation but through which they should also
try to develop forms of executive action, undertaken on behalf
of all members, and aiming at forestalling conflicts and resolving them, once they have arisen, by appropriate diplomatic or
political means, in a spirit of objectivity and in implementation
of the principles and purposes of the Charter. .... 2
When Mr. Hammarskjold wrote those words in 1961, the problem
of financing peace-keeping operations had not yet approached critical
proportions. The Secretary-General had, however, just been subjected to
a blistering attack by the Soviet Union and its allies for his conduct
of peace-keeping operations in the Congo, culminating in the proposal
for a "troika" or three-headed Secretariat designed to reflect an assumed
three-way division of the membership into a Western bloc, a Socialist
bloc, and a neutralist bloc.3 Although the "'troika" has become, for the
time being at least, a dead issue, echoes of the conflict between the
Secretary-General and the Soviet Union still haunt the debate on
how the financial obligations of the past are to be finally liquidated and
on how similar operations are to be initiated, directed, and financed in
the future. That debate has continued' during the past four years at
various levels of the United Nations-on the floor of the Assembly itself,
in successive committees or working groups specially created to deal with
the problem, before the International Court of Justice and in innumerable backstage consultations. Despite all of these efforts, no solution in
the form of a working agreement amongst the principal disputants has
been achieved. On the contrary, so apparently unbridgeable was the gulf
that a move to invoke in this context Article 19 of the Charter, which
denies the right to vote in the General Assembly to any member "if the
amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions
2 Introduction to the Secretary-General's Annual Report to the General Assembly on
the Work of the Organization, June 16, 1960-June 15, 1961, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rzc.
16th Sess., Supp. No. IA (A/4800/Add.1), at 1 (1961).
3 See Khrushchev speeches, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rzc. 15th Sess., Plenary 345
(A/PV.882), at 318-21 (1960). See generally BAILEY, THE SECRETARiAT oF THE UNIrED
NATIONS 44-59 (rev. ed. 1964).
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due from it during the preceding two full years," resulted in the virtual
paralysis and ultimate suspension of the parliamentary processes of the
4
General Assembly.
It is too early to say whether the temporary suspension of the Nineteenth Assembly will go down in history as the beginning of gradual
atrophy or debilitation or more happily as the pause that refreshes. Before
suspending until September 1, 1965, the Nineteenth Assembly was at
least able to give birth to still another committee, the so-called Committee of Thirty-Three, "to undertake as soon as possible a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their
aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties
of the Organization."5 While it is unlikely that the Committee will discover aspects of the question which have not been fully explored by its
4 In order to avoid a confrontation on the issue of the application of Article 19 the
General Assembly proceeded in accordance with the suggestion of the Secretary-General
that no matters would be brought before the Assembly except those which could be
disposed of by acclamation or unanimous consent until a more fundamental resolution
of the underlying controversy could be accomplished. U.N. Gai. Ass. OFF. Rxc. 19th
Sess., Plenary 1286 (A/PV.1286), at 3-5 (1964). But behind the scenes some decisions
were taken by the rather transparent device of informal voting in the office of the
President of the Assembly followed by formal ratification through consensus in the
Assembly itself. The Assembly also adopted resolutions establishing subordinate bodies
which were permitted to carry on the work without any restrictions on voting procedures. Particularly notable was Resolution 1995, "Establishment of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development as an Organ of the General Assembly."
A/RES/1995 (XIX) (1965). This created the Conference itself, the Trade and Development Board to be elected by the Conference, and a special division of the Secretariat
to be headed by a Secretary-General of the Conference who would be appointed by the
U.N. Secretary-General and confirmed by the Assembly. Both the Board and the Conference's Secretary-General were duly installed, the Board held a series of meetings and
elected committees, and arrangements were made for the continuing work of the
Conference.
A challenge to this means of avoiding an open confrontation was made on February
16, 1965, by the Albanian representative, who called for a return to normal procedures.
U.N. GEN. OFF. Ass. REC. 19th Sess., Plenary 1329 (A/PV.1329), at 11 (1965). After a two
day adjournment, the President of the Assembly ruled the Albanian proposal out-oforder. This ruling was challenged by Albania, but sustained by the Assembly by 97 to
2 with 13 abstentions. The roll call was preceded by a United States statement that a
vote on a challenge to the President's ruling did not involve the question of the
applicability of Article 19.
See generally Greenfield, The Lost Session at the U.N., The Reporter, May 6, 1965,
p. 14; Cohen, Using the U.N., The New Republic, May 8, 1965, p. 13.
5 A/RES/2006 (XIX) (1965). The President of the General Assembly was authorized
to establish the Committee with the collaboration of the Secretary-General and to
announce its composition after appropriate consultations. On March 2, 1965, its composition was announced as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Iraq, Italy,
Japan, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sierra
Leone, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom,
United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. A/RES/2006/Rev. 1 (xix) (1965).
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predecessors 6 or by academic commentators, 7 it may yet be hoped
that the necessity for a resolution of the immediate paralysis has become
sufficiently apparent to mother the invention of at least a face-saving
formula which will enable the General Assembly to function normally
without entirely sacrificing potential capacity to meet the emergencies
which undoubtedly lie ahead. In order to help evaluate the success or

failure of the Committee in achieving its assigned objective the following
topics will be considered: (1) the constitutional basis for peace-keeping

operations; (2) the principles of law or policy which have been evolved
to govern their administration; and (3) the various methods of financing
which have been tried or canvassed.
I. THE

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF PEACE-KEEPING

It is a commonplace of United Nations lore, though one not fully accepted by all the Members, that the kind of peace-keeping operations

which have precipitated the "financial crisis"-particularly the establishment of UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) and ONUC (United
Nations Force in the Congo)-were foreshadowed neither in the specific
6 Working Group of Fifteen, Report, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 16th Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item No. 62, at 1-11 (A/4971) (1961); Working Group on the Examination of
the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, U.N. GEN. Ass.
OFF. REC. 4th Spec. Sess. Annexes, Agenda Item No. 7, at'56 (A/5407) (1963).
7 See, e.g., BowLrr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES (1964); BURNS & HEATHCOTE, PEACEBY UN FORCEs-FROm SUEZ TO THE CONGO (1963); FRYDENBERG, PEACE-KEEPING:
EXPERIENCE AND EVALUATION-THE OSLO PAPERS (1964); HOSKINS, THE CONGO SINCE
INDEPENDENCE (1965); LEFEVER, CRISIS IN THE CONGO (1965); ROSNER, THE UNITED
NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (1963); RUSSELL, UNrrED NATIONS EXPERIENCE WITII MILITARY
FORCES: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS (1963); STOESSINGER, FINANCING THE UNITED
NATIONS SYSTEI
(1964); International Force-A Symposium, 17 INT'L ORGANIZATION 321-485 (1963); SEYERSTED, United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems, 37
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 351 (1961).
8 I have mentioned in the text only those operations which have contributed substantially to the "arrears" of the recalcitrant members. The Soviet Union had also
announced, "From 1963 onwards, [it] will not make any contributions to cover the
following items of expenditure in the regular budget of the United Nations, where
funds are allocated for measures taken in violation of the Charter or taken unnecessarily: the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;
the Memorial Cemetery in Korea; the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
in Palestine and the so-called United Nations Field Service." U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC.
4th Spec. Sess., Plenary 1205 (A/PV.21) (1963).
As of December 31, 1964, a report by the Secretary-General showed a total of arrears
of $29,550,285.50 in the Special Account for UNEF and $81,755,398.99 in the Congo
ad hoc Account. Of these, $15,638,166.00 and $36,984,971.00 were accounted for by
the U.S.S.R. and $16,143,83.00 by France. U.N. Doc. ST/ADM/Ser. B/194, Jan. 14, 1965.
The most recent report of the Committee on Contributions listed ten Member
States whose arrears exceeded the amount of assessed contributions for 1962 and 1963
as of October 5, 1964. The ten were Bolivia, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Paraguay, Poland, Rumania, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R. and Yemen. A
separate opinion by Mr. S. Raczkowski pointed out that in only one case, that of
Paraguay, did the arrears in the regular budget assessments, as distinguished from
KEEPING
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provisions of the Charter nor in the deliberations of the Founding
Fathers at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. 9 Hence, the peace-keeping operations have prompted a prolonged and apparently endless
debate on what, if any, Charter rationale can justify the operations and
on whether peace-keeping operations are indeed constitutionally distinguishable from that type of "action by air, sea or land forces" which
the Security Council alone is explicitly authorized by Article 42 of
Chapter VII of the Charter to take in order to "maintain or restore
international peace and security." The debate does not, however, hinge
entirely on whether the particular operations are sired in the first instance by the Security Council or the General Assembly. 10 This is evident from the fact that the Soviet Union and its satellites have refused
to pay either for UNEF or for ONUC, although the first was authorized
by the General Assembly and the second by the Security Council, while
France, the other major defaulter, pays cheerfully for UNEF but refuses
to contribute one cent for ONUC. These rather curious combinations
of apparently inconsistent positions have nonetheless a kind of "inner
logic" of their own which can perhaps best be understood through examination of their intellectual evolution, rather than by a strictly logical
analysis.
Uniting for Peace
This evolution commenced with the debate on the Uniting for Peace
Resolution of 1950. In introducing to the General Assembly the proposals which gave birth to the Uniting for Peace Resolution," Secretary
peace-keeping assessments, amount to the assessed contributions for 1962 and 1963.

U.N. Doc. G.A. Off. Rec. Nineteenth Sess., No. 10(A/5810) 1964, pp. 10-11.
9 See GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 237-308 (2d ed. 1949);
RUSSELL & MATHER, A HISTORY

OF THE

UNrrED NATIONS CHARTER 457-77, 657-84 (1958).

Commenting on Article 40, Goodrich & Hambro say: "Provisional measures envisaged
by this Article may include the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of armed forces from
specified areas, the acceptance of some form of international policing arrangement
within a specified area, and the termination of retaliatory measures which have been
taken in connection with a particular dispute or situation." Op. cit. supra at 273.
During the discussions of the Committee of Thirty-Three the representative of
Brazil "recalled the proposal made by the Foreign Minister of Brazil during the General
Debate at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly that the Charter should be
amended to include a new chapter, entitled 'Peace-keeping Operations,' between the
present Chapters VI and VII. That chapter would set out the conditions under which
peace-keeping operations would be undertaken and would provide in more precise
terms for a method of financing such operations." U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121[SR.4, at
11 (1965).
10 See Excerpts from Remarks by President de Gaulle, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1965, p.
12; Boyd, The U.N. At Twenty, The Economist, April 3, 1965, pp. 39, 43.
11 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20 (A/1175) at 10-12 (1950). The
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of State Acheson stated succinctly what has been the position of the
United States ever since. He said:
Article 24 of the Charter gives the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and this is the way
it should be. But if the Security Council is not able to act because of the obstructive tactics of a permanent member, the
Charter does not leave the United Nations impotent. The obligation of all Members to take action to maintain or restore the
peace does not disappear because of a veto. The Charter in Articies 10, 11, and 14, also vests in the General Assembly authority and responsibility for matters affecting international peace.
The General Assembly can and should organize itself to discharge its responsibility promptly 12and decisively if the Security
Council is prevented from acting.
The Uniting for Peace resolution undertook to implement this philosophy through four specific measures. It resolved in Part A, that
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security in any
case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall
consider the matter immediately with a view to making the
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measResolution was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstenstions. France was an enthusiastic
supporter and co-sponsor of the Resolution.
12 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 5th Sess., Plenary 279 (A/PV.279), at 24 (1950). Articles
10, 11 and 14, upon which Mr. Acheson relied, in pertinent part, read as follows:
Art. 10: "The General Assembly may discuss any question or any matters within the
scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs
provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or
to both on any such questions or matters."
Art. 11, para. 2: "The General Assembly -may discuss any questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of
the United Nations . . . in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as
provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such question
to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or both. Any such questions
on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General
Assembly either before or after discussion."
Art. 14: "Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which
it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter
setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."
Article 12 provides, in part: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of
any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or
situation unless the Security Council so requests."
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ures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of
aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain
or restore international peace and security.
This part of the Resolution also provided for the calling of an emergency
special session of the General Assembly, if it was not then in session,
upon the request of the Security Council by vote of any seven members of the council or by vote of a majority of the Members of the
United Nations. In Part B the Resolution established a Peace Observation Commission composed of fourteen member nations "to observe
and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." In Part C the Resolution
invited member nations to survey their resources to determine the nature
and scope of assistance they might be able to render in support of recommendations of either the Security Council or the General Assembly
for the restoration of international peace and security and recommended
that "each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements
so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made
available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as
a United Nations unit or units upon recommendation by the Security
Council or General Assembly." Finally, the Resolution in Part D established a Collective Measures Committee of fourteen Members to study
and report in consultation with the Secretary-General on methods which
might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and
security. Apart from directly requesting the Secretary General to provide
the necessary staff and facilities for the work of the Peace Observation
Commission and Collective Measures Committee and also to appoint
a panel of military experts who could be made available to member
states wishing to obtain technical advice on the establishment and training of United Nations units, the Resolution did not specify what role the
Secretary-General should play in the actual direction and use of the
national armed units which might thus be made available to the United
Nations. The Resolution was, of course, presented in the shadow of the
Korean hostilities, and its sponsors may well have had in mind the
Korean example of delegating to a particular nation or group of nations
the responsibility for providing a unified United Nations command for
the military units assembled pursuant to the Resolution, or they might
have considered the nature of the command as one of the principal subjects of study for the Collective Measures Committee.13 Neither did the
13 In its first Report the Collective Measures Committee suggested that until such
time as arrangements contemplated by Chapter VII could be used, "the United
Nations whenever it determines upon the use of collective force, must provide some
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Resolution advert specifically to the problems of financing United
Nations military action.
In the debate on the Resolution, Mr. Vyshinski for the U.S.S.R. was
not bashful in directing attention to what he regarded as the dangerous
lacunae in the Resolution. Section C drew the brunt of his attack.
The USSR delegation could not agree to the proposal because
it constituted an attempt to usurp the right of the Security
Council and violated Chapter VII of the Charter which provided for armed forces to be put under the control not of the
General Assembly but of the Security Council through its Military Staff Committee. The proposal would call upon Member
States to earmark armed elements to await orders. But whose
orders? They would be subject to the orders not of the Security
Council, as provided in the Charter, but of the General Assembly. Mr. Dulles had contended that the General Assembly
would not order but would merely recommend. Various representatives, however, had pointed out in the Committee, that a
recommendation, morally speaking, was tantamount to an order.
But where did the Charter endow the General Assembly with
the function of recommending troop movements . . . . Article
11 stipulated that any question on which action was necessary
must be referred to the Security Council. The movement of
armed forces would obviously be for the purpose of taking
action. Therefore, Section C of the joint draft resolution was
basically and fundamentally incompatible with the Charter.14
The representative of the United Kingdom, one of the co-sponsors of
the Resolution, assumed the burden of answering Mr. Vyshinsky's arguments on the technical level:
The United Kingdom delegation attached the greatest importance to the problem of the conformity of the draft resolution
with the letter of the Charter. In legal questions, the British
were if anything too formalistic, and in the case in point they
would not have supported the United States proposals had they
agency to be responsible for the direction and conduct of its military operations." The
most specific suggestion along this line was that "the Organization should authorize a
State or group of States to act on its behalf as executive military authority, within
the framework of its policies and objectives as expressed through such resolutions as
it may adopt at any stage of the collective action." Collective Measures Committee, U.N.
GEN. Ass. OFF. RIc. 6th Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 25 (A/ 1891) (1952).
14 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., 1st Comm. 375 (A/C.1/375), at 85 (1950).
Mr. Vyshinski also objected to paragraph 9 of the draft resolution on the ground that
the military experts and advisors would be under the orders of the Secretary-General.
Ibid. See also his remarks in the plenary session, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess.,
Plenary 301, at 324-35 (A/PV.301) (1950).
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not been convinced that they were based on the letter of the
Charter ....
His delegation recognized that the Charter did not give the
General Assembly the power to take coercive action. The Assembly could only make recommendations, but experience had
shown that the recommendations of the General Assembly carried great force, in the same way as the Security Council recommendations had done on the Korean question in virtue of Article 39.
If therefore a General Assembly recommendation implied positive action by a Member State it was perfectly lawful for the
Member State to exercise the powers it already possessed under
international law, including the right to defend itself and to
assist friendly powers in the face of unjustified aggression. The
Charter did not diminish those rights; it merely provided in
Article 51 that when the Security Council intervened nations
had to obey its decision. But there was also no violation of the
Charter when the General Assembly, acting within its power,
recommended to governments that they should exercise their
right of self-defense, and the latter complied. 15
The United Kingdom analysis, in effect, defended the ultimate action
in response to a recommendation of the General Assembly, not so much
as United Nations action, but as action by member nations individually
or collectively exercising their right of self-defense under the Charter.
This theory has also been advanced in academic circles as necessary for
rationalizing the Korean action under the Charter, even though the
Security Council recommended the action and purported to treat the
United States commanding officer'as a United Nations commander and
the combined allied forces as United Nations forces. 16 Similarly the
15 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., 1st Comm. 364 (A/C.1/364) (1950). The
Representative of the United Kingdom also paid particular attention to Article 11,
which requires questions on which action is necessary to be referred to the Security
Council: "The word 'action' was not defined and it was natural to think that it meant
coercive action which only the Security Council was authorized to take." However,
even if the word were given a wider meaning, if the procedure of referring the matter
to the Security Council were followed, "and if the Security Council did not make use
of its powers, Article 11 would not in any way preclude the General Assembly from
exercising in such a situation, the powers conferred upon it by Article 10." Id. at 129130. For a similar view see Andrassy, Uniting for Peace, 50 AM. J. INT'L LAW 563
(1956).
16 See STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICt (rev. with supp. 1959)
234-237. Kelsen, on the other hand, argues that the Korean action could not be regarded
as individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 "since it was entered upon after
the Council had taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security." KELSEN, THE LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS 936 (1964). Nevertheless, Kelsen
also doubts whether the Korean action can be considered as United Nations action
because the Council did not purport to place members under an obligation to assist in

630

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:621

Uniting for Peace Resolution (Part C) urged each Member to prepare
armed forces "for service as a United Nations unit or units ... without
prejudice to [and thus presumably also in contradistinction to] the use
of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter."'1 It seems, therefore,
that reference to Article 51 alone is insufficient to provide a satisfactory
Charter rationale for the kind of action contemplated by the
Resolution.' 8
UNEF and ONUC
While the exact substantive legal relationship, if any, between the
Uniting for Peace Resolution and the establishment of UNEF by the
First Emergency Special session of the General Assembly in 1956 is a
nice subject for academic speculation, 19 the procedural relation was
the defense of South Korea. Bowett rejects both of these positions and concludes, "The
better view is to regard the Korean action as enforcement action authorized by
recommendations under Article 39." BowErr, op. cit. supra note 7, at 34. Even Kelsen
concedes that this is a possible view. See KELSEN, op. cit. supra at 937.
17 Article 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by the Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
18 It should be noted that in other remarks the United Kingdom representative
indicated that he was relying upon Article- 51 as a guide to, or support for, an
interpretation of Articles 10, 11 and 12 which would permit the General Assembly to
establish "collective defence measures approved by a truly international organization
expressing the will of nations." U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rc. 5th Sess., 1st Comm. 360,
at 101 (A/C.1/360) (1950). Professor Stone seems to go further than this by treating
Article 51 as the principal, if not sole, constitutional basis for the Uniting for Peace
Resolution. See STONE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 272-278. Kelsen rejects this view,
partly on the ground that "a resolution by which the General Assembly recommends
to members to exercise their right of individual or collective self-defense by using
armed force against a definite state, implies that the Assembly determines the
existence of an arme4 attack, which is an act of aggression, and that the Assembly
determines that the state against which it recommends the use of armed force is the
aggressor. This is a function which the Charter does not confer upon the General
Assembly, but in Articles 39 and 51--exclusively upon the Security Council." KELSEN,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 979. Stone rejects this argument on the ground that
the Assembly does not necessarily make any such determination when it recommends
collective measures. See generally COHEN, THE UNIrE NATIONS (1961), ch. 1 on
Charter interpretation in general and on the particular application of the Charter to
Uniting for Peace.
19 See BowETr, op. cit. supra note 7, at 296, emphasizing that Uniting for Peace
was intended to authorize "enforcement measures," while UNEF was designed for
more limited purposes.
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reasonably clear despite objections presented by the United Kingdom and
France. The United States presented a draft resolution calling for an
immediate cease-fire between Israel and Egypt, for a withdrawal of
Israeli forces behind the established armistice lines, and for all members
to refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. After this had been vetoed by France and
the United Kingdom, the Council adopted a Yugoslavian resolution
calling for an Emergency Special Session of the Assembly pursuant to the
Uniting for Peace Resolution.20 The U.S.S.R. voted in support of the
Council's Resolution, but abstained on the Assembly's key resolution
establishing the United Nations force. 21 The Soviet representative explained that he regarded the resolution as inconsistent with the Charter
because "Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council and
the Security Council only, not the General Assembly, to set up an international armed force and to take such action as it may deem necessary,
including the use of such a force, to maintain or restore international
peace and security." Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. abstained rather than
opposed, "in view of the fact that... the victim of aggression has been
compelled to agree to the introduction of an international force," and "in
the hope that this may prevent any further extension of the aggression .... ,22 This was substantially the only reference to the constitutional question during the General Assembly's consideration of the
establishment of UNEF.
Since ONUC was established and governed by resolutions of the
Security Council, its creation did not present the basic constitutional
question of division of powers between the General Assembly and the
Security Council. Nevertheless, there has been considerable speculation
and difference of opinion on the exact Charter provision under which
the Council acted. 23 As usual the initial Resolution did not refer to any
particular provision; neither did it make any determination as required
by Article 39 on "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
peace, or act of aggression." It did, however, refer to the "report of the
Secretary General on a request for United Nations action in relation to
the Republic of the Congo" and to "the request for military assistance
addressed to the Secretary General by the President and the Prime Minis20 U.N. SEcuRrry CouNcIL OFF. Rac. l1th year, 751st meeting 22 (S/PV.751) (1956).
The point of the procedural objections of the U.K. and France was that there had been
no vote on the Egyptian complaint directed specifically against them.
21 U.N. GEN. Ass. OrF. Rim. 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Plenary 565 (A/PV.565) (1956).
22 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Plenary 567, at 27-28
(A/PV.567) (1956).
23 See BowrTr, op. cit. supra note 7, at 175-80.
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24

ter of the Republic of the Congo." In bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council under Article 99 the Secretary General
had, of course, described it as one "which, in my opinion, may threaten
the maintenance of international peace and security." 25 The President
and Prime Minister of the Congo had, in connection with their request
for military assistance, asserted that "the purpose of the requested
aid is not to restore internal situation in Congo but rather to protect
the national territory against acts of aggression committed by Belgian
metropolitan troops." 26 There was from the outset disagreement within
the Council whether this was an appropriate description of the Belgian
intervention, but this was never elevated to an objection to the validity
or the desirability of the action proposed. The Secretary-General stated
in his first submission that he would not "pronounce himself" on the
legal and political aspects of the Belgian intervention, but that he did
conclude that the "presence of these troops is a source of internal and
potentially also of international tension." He also stated, "it would be
understood that were the United Nations to act as proposed, the Belgian
Government would see its way to a withdrawal." 27 At the same meeting
the Belgian representative confirmed this understanding: "when the
United Nations forces have, as the Belgian Government hopes, rapidly
moved into position and are able to ensure the effective maintenance
of order and the security of persons in the Congo, my Government will
proceed to withdraw its intervening metropolitan forces, which are at
28
present alone capable of ensuring the accomplishment of these aims."
Thus the stage was set for the introduction of a United Nations force
on substantially the same basis as UNEF, namely, entry into the host
country with the consent of that country coincident with the gradual
withdrawal of unwelcome, if not invading, forces of a foreign country. The initial resolution did not describe the exact functions of the
force except as they may be implied from the authorization to the Secretary General: "to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with
such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of
the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United
24 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 16 (S/4387)
(1960). The resolution was adopted by 8 affirmative votes with 3 abstentions-China,
France and the United Kingdom.
25 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 12 (S/4382)
(1960).
26 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 12 (S/4382)
(1960).
27 U.N. SEcURITY COUNCIL OFF. RIc. 15th year, 873d meeting 4-5 (S/PV.544) (1960).
28 Id. at 37.
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Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the
Government, to meet fully their tasks." 29 In practical terms the functions
of UNEF and ONUC were noticeably different. The primary function
of the former was to patrol the borders of two hostile countries in order
to discourage the resumption of hostilities; the principal function of the
latter was to help in the maintenance of internal order. In more general
and abstract terms, however, the objective of both forces was the same,
namely, to facilitate by their very presence the withdrawal of foreign
forces.
Opinion of the InternationalCourt of Justice
The first full dress debate on the constitutional validity of the establishment of UNEF and ONUC occurred in the proceedings of the International Court of Justice in connection with the Advisory Opinion of
July 20, 1962.30 The General Assembly had requested an opinion only
on the question whether
the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions
... relating to United Nations operations in the Congo undertaken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions ... and
the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions...
relating to the operations of the United Nations Emergency
Force undertaken in pursuance of the General Assembly resolutions . . . constitute expenses of the Organization within the
meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United
Nations. 31
There was, in fact, some difference of opinion expressed both in the
arguments before the Court and in the individual opinions of the judges
of the Court on whether this submission properly raised the issue of the
validity of the resolutions authorizing the operations. 32 But the reasoning
29

Op. cit. supra note 24.

30 CERTAIN

EXPENSES

OF THE

UNITED

NATIONS--PLEADINGS,

ORAL

ARGUMENTS,

AND

DOCUMENTS (I.C.J. 1962). See generally Gross, Expenses of the United Nations for PeaceKeeping Operations: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice,
17 INT'L ORGANIZATION 1 (1963); Hogg, Peace-Keeping Costs and Charter Obligations
-Implications of the International Court of Justice Decision on Certain Expenses of
the United Nations, 62 COLuM. L. REv. 1230 (1962); Simmonds, The UN Assessments
Advisory Opinion, 13 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 854 (1964).

16th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/Res/1731) (1961).
France took the position that the issue should not be answered at all because the
phrasing of the request in effect foreclosed its consideration. In support of this position
France pointed to the rejection of a French amendment to the Resolution submitting
the question, which was apparently intended to present the issue. See CERTAIN EX31 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REG.

32

PENSES

OF THE UNITED

NATIONS--PLEADINGS,

ORAL ARGUMENTS,

AND

DOCUMENTS

130

(LC.J. 1962).
The United States argued that the question properly could and should be answered
affirmatively without considering the validity of the underlying resolutions although
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of the Court, which was approved in its entirety by only five of the fourteen sitting judges, seemed to show no hesitancy in considering fully the
arguments addressed to the validity of the underlying resolutions establishing UNEF and ONUC.3 8
After noting that Article 24 confers upon the Security Council "primary" but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the opinion indicates that the authority of
the General Assembly for effective action in this area might be most
clearly and satisfactorily found in Article 14, which provides that the
General Assembly may
recommend measures for peaceful adjustment of any situation,
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations
resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present
forth the purposes and principles of the United
Charter setting
4
Nations.
The members of the Court joining in the opinion were particularly impressed with the applicability of Article 14, because "the word 'measures'
implies some kind of action, and the only limitation which Article 14
the Court was not foreclosed from considering their validity. Id. at 180, 413. The
United States was joined in general support of an affirmative answer to the question by
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and the
United Kingdom. Id. at 230 and 372, 210 and 289, 137, 247 and 387, 125 and 322, 223,
166 and 310, 351, 239 and 835, respectively.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, argued for a negative answer. It addressed
itself directly to the validity of the underlying resolutions and asserted that the question
could not be answered without such consideration. Id. at 270, 397. The negative
position was supported not only by the Soviet group (U.S.S.R., Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian Republic) but also by Portugal, South
Africa, Spain, and Upper Volta. Id. at 270 and 397, 275, 276, 177, 277, 227, 255, 245 and
123, respectively. The objections of Portugal and Spain were directed to the powers of
compulsory assessment rather than the validity of the operations. The objections of
South Africa and Upper Volta were directed primarily to the validity of the Congo
Operation.
33 The Court's opinion does not explicitly direct its attention to the validity of the
resolutions. Instead it primarily considers the argument that "one type of expenses,
namely those resulting from operations for the maintenance of international peace
and security, are not 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter, inasmuch as they fall to be dealt with exclusively by the
Security Council, and more especially through agreements negotiated in accordance
with Article 43 of the Charter." Certain Expenses of the United Nations [1962] I.C.J.
Rep. In effect the Court telescoped into one question what had been treated in most
of the arguments as two separate questions, the validity of the operations themselves
and the validity of the method of financing them. This approach tends to focus the
opinion generally on the budgetary or financial question rather than on the validity
of the underlying resolutions. In its more detailed consideration, however, the Court
considers the specific arguments challenging the validity of the resolutions or their
implementation by the Secretary-General.
34 Id. at 163.
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imposes on the General Assembly is the restriction found in Article 12,
namely, that the Assembly should not recommend measures while the
Security Council is dealing with the same matter unless the Council requests it to do so." 35 Such "measures" were not to be confused with

"coercive action" which was exclusively the province of the Security
Council, but neither were they "merely hortatory." "Article 18 deals with
'decisions' of the General Assembly 'on important questions.' These 'decisions' do indeed include certain recommendations, but others have
dispositive force and effect." 3 6
The Court also took particular note of the argument that Article 11,
paragraph 2, indicates the exclusive authority of the Security Council on
any action directed to the maintenance of international peace and
security. Special emphasis had been placed on the last sentence of that
article, which reads, "Any such question [relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security] on which action is necessary shall be
referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before
or after discussion." The Court responded that
the kind of action referred to in Article 11, paragraph 2, is
coercive or enforcement action .... The word "action" must

mean such action as is solely within the province of the Security
Council. It cannot refer to recommendations which the Security
Council might make, as for instance under Article 88, because
the General Assembly under Article 11 has a comparable power.
The "action" which is solely within the province of the Security
Council is that which is indicated by the title of Chapter VII
of the Charter, namely, "action" with respect to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression .... Accord-

ingly, the last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2, has no
application where the necessary action is not enforcement
37
action.
The argument as stated is somewhat circular. The action referred to in
Article 11 is the kind of action which is solely within the province of
the Security Council; that kind of action is only "coercive or enforcement action." But the Court did not rely merely on textual analysis. It
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.

As examples the Court mentioned suspension of rights and privileges of
membership, expulsion of Members, and budgetary questions.
37 Id. at 164-65. Chapter VII does not itself use the terms "coercive" or "enforcement." However, Article II, paragraph 5 refers to "preventive or enforcement action"
and Article II, paragraph 7 to "enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Article 53
also refers to "enforcement action" authorized by the Security Council through utilization of "regional arrangements."
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found in addition that "the practice of the Organization throughout
its history bears out the foregoing elucidation of the term 'action' in the
last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2."38 It referred in particular to
the Assembly's establishment of various committees, commissions or other
bodies as subsidiary organs under Article 22 whose actions of investigation, observation or supervision depended upon the "consent of the
State or States concerned."3 9
In applying these generalizations to the particular operations in controversy, the Court relied heavily upon the description of the functions of
UNEF, submitted by the Secretary-General and approved by the General
Assembly without a dissenting vote, to demonstrate that its establishment
was not in effect enforcement action under Chapter VII. According to
the Secretary-General,
it [the force] would be more than an observers' corps, but in no
way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in
which it is stationed; nor moreover should the force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful
conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict
take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommenda40
tions of the General Assembly.
On the basis of this description and "the subsequent operations of the
Force," the opinion concluded that "these 'actions' may be considered
'measures' recommended under Article 14, rather than 'action' recommended under Article 11 ."41
The Court was not quite so explicit in determining under just what
article the ONUC would most naturally fall, but it was just as emphatic
in concluding that "the operation did not involve 'preventive or enforcement measures' against any. state under Chapter VII and therefore did
not constitute 'action' as that term is used in Article 11. ' 42 It pointed out
38 Id.

at 165.

39 Ibid. The opinion does not give specific examples of such "subsidiary organs." It

might have mentioned the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), established
by the General Assembly on Dec. 12, 1948, A/RES/195 (III) (1948), and the United
Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), established by the General

Assembly on Oct. 21, 1947, A/RES/109 (II) (1947). See generally, Bowarr, op. cit. supra
note 7, ch. 4.
40 [1962] I.C.J. REP. at 171, quoting from second and final report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Plan for an Emergency International United Nations Force, U.N.
GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 1st Emergency Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5, at 19-22
(A/3302) (1956).
41 [1962] I.C.J. Rz,. at 171-72.
42 Id. at 177. At another point the Court said, "Articles of Chapter VII of the
Charter speak of situations and it must lie within the power of the Security Council to
police a situation even though it does not resort to enforcement action against a state."
Id. at 167.
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that there had been no determination under Article 39 that any state
had committed an act of aggression or had breached the peace and
that ONUC was not authorized to take military action against any state.
Presumably this did not rule out the possibility that there had been an
implied determination of a "threat to the peace" under Article 39 and a
decision to take provisional measures under Article 40, although it assumes that the establishment of ONUC did not constitute action by air,
43
sea or land forces under Article 42.

The foregoing passages culled from different parts of the opinion
might be constructed into a pattern of Charter interpretation recognizing a type of peace-keeping operation which may be authorized by
either the General Assembly or Security Council and which is to be
clearly distinguished from the type of enforcement or coercive measures
44
which may be authorized only by the Security Council under Article 42.
It will be recalled, however, that the reasoning of the Court was fully
concurred in by only five members of the Court and may in some respects
represent only a minority view. Close examination of the concurring
opinions indicates that only seven of the nine judges who joined in
the conclusion of the Court expressly committed themselves on the validity of the resolutions authorizing the operations.4 5 On the other hand, not
all of the five dissenting judges passed explicitly on the issue of the
validity of the underlying resolutions. Although Judge Winiarski in his
dissent expressed doubt about their validity, he relied principally upon
the ground that both the UNEF and Congo resolutions were recommendations rather than binding decisions and that therefore "the resolutions approving and apportioning these expenses are valid and binding
only in respect of the Member States which have accepted the recommendations." 46 Judge Koretsky was more emphatic in his dissent in
rejecting as unfounded the distinction between peace-keeping and enforcement measures. He concluded that the resolutions establishing
UNEF were clearly invalid in their entirety and those relating to the
43 This conclusion made inapplicable the arguments based particularly upon
Article 43, i.e., that only the Security Council could make financial arrangements for

defraying the cost of the Congo operations. Compare the submission of the Soviet
Union, supra note 32, at 273, 404.
44 While the Court's distinction between "peace-keeping operations" and "enforcement action" was implicit in the submissions of several states, it was most fully

developed in the written statement of Denmark, supra note 32, at 156-61.
45 Judge Spiropoulos and Judge Sir Percy Spender disassociated themselves from any
expression of opinion on the validity of the underlying resolutions. [1962] I.C.J. Rip.
at 180, 182. Judges Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Morelli, while they wrote separate
opinions, indicated general agreement with the Court's treatment of the validity of
the underlying resolutions. Id. at 200, 216.
46

Id. at 233.
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Congo invalid insofar as they sought to bypass Article 43 and to entrust
to the General Assembly the authority to apportion the expenses of the
operations. 47 Two other dissenters, while being primarily concerned with
the inadequacy of the question presented, expressed skepticism about the
48
arguments advanced in support of the underlying resolutions.
Despite the dissenting opinions, the General Assembly voted to accept
the opinion of the court by substantially more than a two-thirds majority,
including affirmative votes from a number of countries who had not
voted in favor of submission of the question.49 In the debate on the
Resolution to accept the opinion, however, both France and the Soviet
bloc indicated quite clearly that they had no intention of changing their
basic positions. 50 Since then the principal opposing positions on the
constitutional questions have been stated again and again with only
slight differences in phrasing which would occasionally give rise to
speculation on possible shifts of position. The principal forum for the
debates has been the successive Working Groups.
Committee DiscussionsSince the Court's Opinion
In a document first presented to the Working Group of Twenty-One on
September 11, 1964,51 and recirculated to the Committee of Thirty-Three
in April 1965, the Soviet Union restated its grounds for insisting on
the invalidity of both the UNEF and ONUC operations. The UNEF
argument was very simply summarized:
In matters relating to the maintenance of international peace
and security, the United Nations Charter clearly delimits the
competence of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. According to the Charter, only the Security Council is empowered to decide questions relating to the taking of action to
47

Id.

48

Judges Quintana and Bustamante expressed doubt on the validity and applicability

at 253-87.

of the distinction between peace-keeping and enforcement operations. Id. at 246, 296.
49

U.N. GEN. Ass.

OFF.

REc. 17th Sess., Plenary 1199 (A/PV.1199) (1962); A/RES/1854

(XVII) (1962). The vote was 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions. (The vote on submitting the

question had been 52 to 11, with 32 abstentions). Part B of the resolution re-established
the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary
Procedures of the United Nations with the same membership as that established by
A/RES/1620 (XV) (1961), but with its membership increased from 15 to 21.
50 See particularly the discussion in the Fifth Committee, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. RFc.
17th Sess., 5th Comm. at 275, 279 (A/C.5fSR.961); id. at 284 (A/C.5/SR.962); id. at 297,
300 (A/C.5/SR.965); id. at 311 (A/C.5/SR.967); id. at 319 (A/C.5/SR.968); id. at 325
(A/C.5/SR.969); id. at 337 (A/C.5/SR.971); id. at 341 (A/C.5/SR.972); id. at 347
(A/C.5/SR.973) (1962); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 17th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item
No. 64, at 4 (A/5380) (1962).

51 U.N. Doc. No. A/5729 (1964).
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maintain international peace and security; the establishment of
the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East falls
2
into this category.5
The constitutional objection of the U.S.S.R. to ONUC could not, however, be so simply stated. The memorandum of September 11, 1964,
summarized the principal objection as follows:
According to the Charter, the Security Council shall determine
which States shall take part in carrying out its decisions for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Article 48 of
the Charter provides that: "The action required to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members
of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine." In violation of these provisions of the
Charter, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, bypassing
the Security Council, himself determined the group of States
which were invited to take part, with armed forces or otherwise,
in the United Nations operations in the Congo. As early as the
Security Council meeting of 20 July 1960, the USSR representative was compelled to protest against the actions of the SecretaryGeneral which were undertaken in violation of the Security
Council resolution of 14 July.5 3
This paragraph reveals the weakest link in the whole chain of the Soviet
argument on the expenses incurred in the Congo operations. The Resolution of July 14, 1960, in which the Soviet Union joined, explicitly
authorized "the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide
the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary ....,54
Furthermore, there could have been no doubt in the minds of any of
the members of the Security Council that the Secretary-General proposed
to establish the United Nations force in the same manner as UNEF, i.e.,
by concluding agreements with nations who were willing to provide
forces which he considered suitable for the purposes involved. 55 Finally,
52

Id. at 3.

Id. at 5.
54 U.N. SECURITY CoUNcIL OFF. REc. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 16
53

(S/4387) (1960).

55 The Secretary-General stated that he would base his actions "on the principles
which were set out in my report to the General Assembly on the conclusions drawn
from the previous experiences in the field." The reference was to the Report entitled,
Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the
Force: report of the Secretary General. U.N. GEN. Ass. OrE. REc. 13th Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item 65, at 8 (A/3943) (1958). In that report the Secretary-General mentioned
explicitly the principles which would guide him in the acceptance of offers of troops.
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even assuming that Article 48 is fully applicable to the nature of the
action involved,56 it is hard to see why the authorization of the SecretaryGeneral to reach agreements with such individual Members as were
willing to provide such forces was not itself a determination by the
Security Council that such forces should be provided by some Members
of the United Nations, rather than all of them in strict accordance with
Article 48. The Soviet assumption that Article 48 means the Security
Council must itself decide which Members are to be permitted to supply troops seems to fly in the face of the very principles of strict construction upon which the U.S.S.R. customarily relies. Apart from this
somewhat unrewarding kind of textual analysis, there is no reason to
assume that Article 48 constitutes an exception to the Security Council's
general powers of delegation explicitly mentioned in Article 29, which
authorizes the Security Council to establish such subsidiary organs as it
deems necessary for the performance of its functions, and again in Article
98, which directs the Secretary-General to "perform such other functions
as are entrusted to him by these organs [including the Security Council]."57 In fact the Security Council did exercise some control over the
selection of Members to contribute forces by its tacit approval of the
Secretary-General's proposals that forces of permanent Members of the
Security Council would be excluded and that forces from African states
would be particularly welcome.
The truth of the matter is that the real basis of the U.S.S.R.'s objections
to ONUC was not the method of its establishment but rather the manner
in which its operations were conducted. This is intimated in the U.S.S.R.
statement that
it is possible to conceive a situation in which the requirements
of the Charter are satisfied as regards the establishment of
United Nations armed forces, but the activity of those forces is
so directed as to produce results which are diametrically opposed
to the purposes set forth in the Charter. This is precisely what
happened in the Congo. 58
56 This assumption involves again the question whether the "action" referred to is
only "enforcement action" of the type authorized by Article 42 or whether it would
include "peace-keeping" operations authorized by the Security Council under some
other power.
57 The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice also relied -upon the
Security Council's powers of delegation and its repeated approval, with the Soviet
Union's affirmative vote, of the Secretary-General's initial conduct of the Congo
operations as grounds for rejecting the U.S.S.R.'s challenge to their validity. [1962]
I.C.J. R P. at 175-77.
58 U.N. Doc. No. A/6729, at 5 (1964).
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Not even the protests against the Secretary-General's conduct of operations, to which the Soviet memorandum refers, contained the slightest
hint of constitutional objection to the creation, mandate, or operations
of the force. 59 Even at the height of the U.S.S.R.'s disenchantment with
the Congo operation and with the Secretary-General, 60 Mr. Zorin in the
Security Council debate did not challenge the validity of ONUC's mandate or call for its immediate termination. 61 It seems fair to conclude,
therefore, that the Soviet Union's objections to the constitutional validity of the Congo operations were really afterthoughts designed to bolster
its general position on the invalidity of the assessments.
France also circulated a position paper, dated October 16, 1964,62 to
the Working Group of Twenty-One to make clear its objection to the
validity of the assessments which it was refusing to pay. Although the
French refusal applied only to the Congo operations and not to UNEF,
its legal position was substantially the same on both. That position was
"based first of all on the fact, which is borne out by reference to the
Charter, that the General Assembly is not endowed by that document
with the powers of a world government and therefore cannot take majority decisions which impose obligations on States that have not accepted
them"; and second, "on the fact that, as regards peace-keeping operations, 'there is only one category of binding decisions, those adopted by
the Security Council in the cases specified and in the manner prescribed
by the Charter.' "63 "The United Nations operations in the Middle East
and the Congo were not undertaken in pursuance of binding decisions
under Chapter VII of the Charter. Hence, the recommendations of the
59 The main gravamen of the Soviet complaint was that the United Nations was
not acting with sufficient speed and effectiveness to require the withdrawal of Belgium
troops and to "ensure the territorial inviolability and integrity of the country." U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, 877th meeting 34-35 (S/PV.877) (1960).
60 This was immediately after the death of Lumumba. As the memorandum of
September 21, 1964, states, "The USSR government, in its statement of 14 February
1961, roundly condemned the actions of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
and proposed the prompt withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Congo so as to
enable the Congolese people to settle their domestic affairs by themselves .
U.N.
Doc. No. A/5729, at 6 (1964).
61 Instead the U.S.S.R. submitted a draft resolution which in part directed "the
command of the troops that are in the Congo pursuant to the decision of the Security
Council immediately to arrest Tshombe and Mobutu in order to deliver them for trial,
to disarm all the military units and 'gendarmerie' forces under their control, and to
ensure the immediate disarming and removal of all Belgian troops and all Belgian
personnel .... ." After accomplishing these drastic measures the United Nations
operations in the Congo were to be discontinued. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc.
16th year, 934th meeting, at 24 (S/PV.934) (1961).
02 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.113f47 (1964).
63 Id. at 2-3.
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Council and the Assembly in these matters bind only those states which
have accepted them." 64 The application of these principles to UNEF is
clear. Since the force was not established by the Security Council, it
could not have been created by a binding decision under Chapter VII;
therefore, France's contributions to the "Special Account of the Emergency Force" were entirely voluntary. The position on ONUC is not
quite so dear. The French memorandum undertook to supply the missing link: "In the opinion of the French delegation it is the Security
Council which must prescribe the method of financing and, if necessary,
the apportionment of the expenses incurred in connection with a peacekeeping operation which it has authorized." 65
The French objection in this statement, in essence, went only to the
compulsory financing of peace-keeping operations and not to their authorization, whether by the Security Council or the General Assembly.
This is also consistent with the position taken by the French representative in the debate on acceptance of the opinion of the International
Court of Justice. 66 This position also seemed to accept the validity of
an authorization from either the Security Council or the General Assembly to the Secretary-General to establish peace-keeping forces by agreements with contributing states willing to contribute troops if the financing were by voluntary contributions. It is difficult to see how France
could take any more restrictive a position without abandoning its support of UNEF.
Nevertheless, there has been some concern that France is moving closer
to the U.S.S.R. position insofar as it denies authority to the General
Assembly to authorize peace-keeping operations of a noncoercive character and financed by voluntary contributions. This concern is largely
based on remarks made in the Committee of Thirty-Three by the French
representative, such as the following:
For its part, the French delegation has never alleged and does
not now allege that the Security Council bears exclusive responsibility. My delegation merely notes that the field of respective
responsibilities of the Security Council and the General Assembly is dearly defined by the Charter: on the one hand, in the
case of the Security Council there is the power-and the exclusive power-to legislate, by means of decision or recommendation, on an action of the United Nations, that is, on any operation involving the use of force, whether or not it is directed
against a state; on the other hand, in the case of the General
Assembly there is the power to discuss questions relating to the
64 Id. at 4.

65 Ibid.
66 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 17th Sess., 5th Comm. 284 (A/C.5/SR.962) (1962).
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maintenance of peace and to formulate any recommendation
that does not infringe the prerogatives of the Council, that is,
any recommendation which does not bear on an action but
which, pursuant to the provisions of Artide 14, could bear on
measures appropriate to the peaceful adjustment of the situation
under consideration. That-and only that-constitutes what is
sometimes described as the "residual power of the General Assembly".

... 67

This statement, particularly in its reference to "any operation involving
the use of force, whether or not it is directed against a state," if
taken literally, seems to reject entirely the distinction approved by the
majority opinion of the International Court between enforcement or
coercive measures and peace-keeping operations. It would also bar operations such as those now being conducted by UNEF under the authorization of the General Assembly even if they were financed on a voluntary
basis.
Assuming this to be a correct interpretation of the current French
position,6s it also rejects the painstaking attempts of several delegates
67 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/PV.3, at 17-18 (1965). See also, U.N. Doc.No. A/AC.121/
SR.3, at 9-10 (1965) for an abbreviated but official record.
68 This interpretation seems to be confirmed by a subsequent statement of the
French representative in the Committee of Thirty-Three on May 17, 1965, in which he
made a deliberate effort to elaborate the meaning of his previous remarks. After
referring to the efforts of some delegations to develop a concept of non-coercive peacekeeping operations based on the opinion of the International Court of Justice, the
French delegate continued: "His delegation could not subscribe to such a concept,
which did not take the following considerations into account. In the first place, to
define, implicitly or explicitly, enforcement actions as only those operations directed
against a State was to establish a distinction which was not justified either by the
Charter or by experience. Recent history, indeed, showed that internal conflicts easily
degenerated into international conflicts, even when in theory they remained internal
conflicts. The phenomenon of 'volunteers' showed how arbitrary such a distinction
could be, and the fact that the official Government of the country principally concerned agreed to the presence of a United Nations 'force' on its territory did not
suffice to make internal upheavals out of conflicts which for practical purposes were
international in character. Furthermore, it was not enough to say that the United
Nations force would be authorized to use its weapons only in exceptional circumstances
for the action in question not to be an enforcement action. The history of United
Nations operations showed that the concept of self-defence could be interpreted in
a very broad manner. Moreover, the possibility could not be excluded that a peacekeeping force might itself be tempted to create conditions for its own self-defence or,
above all, that there might be risks inherent in a concatenation of uncontrollable
circumstances. In more general terms, the scope of the force's mandate, and sometimes
its very nature, were subject to change in the course of the operation. An operation
which did not 'in principle' involve the use of force could in fact become an enforcement measure, as had been the case in the Congo when the 'Blue Helmets' had put
down the secession of Katanga. It was therefore wiser to recognize that enforcement
action occurred whenever the use of force was provided for, even where it was restricted to certain hypothetical circumstances. Finally, if the concept of enforcement
action was to be taken as a criterion for Security Council jurisdiction, the Security
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to narrow the area of controversy by suggesting a carefully limited definition of the term "peace-keeping operations." For example, the Swedish
representative made these observations:
I should like to submit, first of all, that decisions taken by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter should not
be included in the term "peace-keeping operation." Such decisions are binding on Member states. If they involve the setting
up of military or police forces, countries may be legally obligated
to receive such forces on their territories, to allow passages, and
even to put contingents at the disposal of the United Nations
to form part of such forces ....
...[I]n the view of the Swedish delegation, we should base ourselves on the practical experiences of the United Nations activities in this field up to now. It then seems reasonable and justified, first of all, to define the concept so as to include only
operations that are essentially voluntary, in that they require
(a) an invitation from, or at least the consent of, a country on
whose territory an operation is to take place, and (b) do not
place any obligations on Member States as to contributions in
the form of personnel, equipment, logistics, etc. I will revert
later to the question of financing.
Beyond what I have now said about the essentially voluntary
character of peace-keeping operations, it is possible to delimit
their scope and to illustrate their functions pragmatically by
citing examples from the practice of the United Nations. Such
examples would be: observation of conditions on one side or
both sides of a frontier; supervision of a truce or an armistice;
Council and the General Assembly might become involved in serious conflicts of jurisdiction. When the establishment of a United Nations force was contemplated, there
could be some doubt at the outset concerning the nature of its mandate, some
countries for example considering that an act of aggression had been committed, while
others might consider the situation as calling merely for a simple police operation,
and lengthy discussions might be necessary to determine the precise nature of the
action to be taken.
"For all those reasons, his delegation believed that the action referred to in Article
11(2) included not only the measures provided for in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter
VII of the Charter but also any measure for the establishment of a force, whether
military or not, to intervene against a State or within a State, even where the latter
consented to the intervention and the effective use of arms was theoretically limited
to restricted or exceptional circumstances. That definition did not include operations
for the purpose of observation, supervision or inquiry, even if the participants in
them were military personnel and even if there were large numbers of them, provided,
however, that they were not constituted into units under military command and that
they were not responsible for their own security, which was a matter for the local
forces. In short, his delegation could support the suggestion made by the representative of India at the fourth meeting that the dispatch of armed personnel otherwise
than for the purpose of observation or investigation should be within the exclusive
power of the Security Council." U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.7, at 5-6 (1965).
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missions of mediation or conciliation, possibly connected with
some investigation or observation to clarify the factual situation; or assistance to a country to maintain law and order in
conditions in which international peace might otherwise be
disturbed.
It goes without saying that a peace-keeping operation should
not be allowed to constitute or be a pretext for any type of
foreign intervention or to infringe on the national sovereignty
of any country. If armed personnel is involved, there should be
an absolute prohibition of the use of force except in selfdefense. 69
The Swedish statement is significant both in the limitations it would
place upon the proper use of peace-keeping forces and also in its assimilation of such forces to other less controversial types of peace-keeping
measures, such as truce supervision, observation, investigation, and
mediation.
The representative of Canada, a country which like Sweden has taken
a leading part in the initiation and actual conduct of peace-keeping
operations, expressed "full agreement with the analysis just presented by
the representative of Sweden regarding the definition of peace-keeping
operations." The Canadian representative also went a step further in
stating that his observations would "therefore exclusively apply to operations undertaken under Chapter VI of the Charter, operations which consequently are not of a coercive character." 70 Particularly in referring to
Chapter VI of the Charter the Canadian representative was more explicit
than the International Court opinion which had been content to deny
that the UNEF and ONUC operations constituted "preventive or enforcement measures" against any state under Chapter VII without foreclosing
the possibility that they might be considered as some other type of action
under Chapter VII. The Secretary-General, while primarily anxious to
make it clear that the Congo operation did not constitute enforcement
69

U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/PV.3, at 3-5 (1965). See also U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/

SR.3, at 4-5 (1965).
70 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/PV.3, at 12 (1965); A/AC.121fSR.3, at 7 (1965). In
referring to "operations undertaken under Chapter VI of the Charter" the Canadian
representative did not mean that the provisions of Chapter VI would be the only
relevant ones. This is made evident by his subsequent reference to Article 14 as an
appropriate basis for the authority of the General Assembly to initiate peace-keeping
operations. One might harmonize both parts of his statement by reference to Article 35
of Chapter VI: "Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any
situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council
or of the General Assembly." Thus it might be said that Chapter VI implicates all the
powers of the General Assembly relevant to the maintenance of international peace
and security as well as the powers of the Security Council which do not involve "enforcement" measures.
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action under Article 42, had also suggested that it might be regarded
as coming within the scope of "provisional measures" mentioned in Article 40 of Chapter VII.7 1 The Canadian representative's reference to
Chapter VI might have been, therefore, a deliberate choice based more on
political than constitutional considerations with the thought perhaps
that it might be easier to find a compromise formula on operations
entirely outside the ambit of Chapter VII.
A somewhat similar approach was also taken by the representative of
Mexico in his presentation to the Committee of Thirty-Three. Although
he did not commit himself explicitly to Chapter VI as did the Canadian
delegate, he was even more emphatic in disassociating the problem entirely from Chapter VII. He did this by appealing to a concept of customary law designed "to cope with new realities that could not have been
foreseen in the Charter." Those realities he defined in part as follows:
Quite properly, for a number of years now we have been witnessing the birth of a new kind of international operations
which, under the aegis of the United Nations, are destined to
maintain peace. The provisions of the Charter are clear and remain inviolate: all actions provided in Chapter VII and the
primary responsibility of the Security Council are not called
into question. On the other hand, we have to appraise a new
form of customary law which so far has not received the general
acceptance of Member States either in its formation, execution
or even in its meaning.
Perhaps for the time being it is unnecessary to decide each and
every one of the characteristic features of these operations; for
the time being, it may suffice to spell out that these operations
71 Speaking in the Security Council on August 8, 1960, the Secretary-General referred
to Articles 25, 40, 41 and 49 as all being possibly relevant to the Congo operations and
particularly to the obligation of member nations under Article 25 "to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council." U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OF. REc. 15th year,
884th meeting 4-5 (S/PV.884) (1960). The Secretary-General was apparently linking this
obligation to the provision of Article 40 that "the Security Council may.... call upon
the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary
or desirable." On December 13, 1960, when the Secretary-General was more concerned
with establishing the limits .upon his authority, he said, "My own view, which I have
expressed to the Council, is that the resolutions may be considered as implicitly
under Article 40 and, in that sense, as based on an implicit finding under Article 39.
But what I should like to emphasize is that neither the Council nor the Assembly
has ever endorsed this interpretation, much less put such endorsement in a resolution.
What is even more certain is that the Council in no way directed that we go beyond
the legal basis of Article 40 and to the coercive action covered by Articles 41 and 42."
U.N. SECURIrv COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, 920th meeting 19 (S/PV.920) (1960). See
also BowETr, UNIrED NATIONs FORCES 174-80 (1964); Miller, Legal Aspects of the United
Nations Action in the Congo, Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1961); Schachter, The Relation of
Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations, 2 REcuEiL DEs CouRs 216-25 (1963).
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can be carried out only with the consent of the State or States
which are parties to the dispute; it is also sufficient to make it
plain that this is a question of military operations in which the
Member States participate in a manner which is fundamentally
different from that provided under Chapter VII of the Charter
and, in particular, where the guarantees laid down under Arti2
cle 43 of the Charter are also considered in a different manner3
If these and somewhat similar comments by other delegations were
designed to narrow the area of controversy and to suggest a possible
bridge to agreement through limiting the possible scope of "peace-keeping operations," 73 they did not succeed in evoking any immediate manifestations of support or even interest from the Societ bloc. The Czechoslovakian representative made the first explicit response in these terms:
There seems to be, in the view of some colleagues, a problem in
defining the concept of peace-keeping operations. As my delegation sees it, we are concerned here in this Committee with a
specific kind of peace-keeping operation, namely where the use
of armed forces by the United Nations is envisaged. As far as
the use of armed forces by the United Nations is concerned,
there is only one part of the Charter which determines this, and
72 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/PV.2, at 32-33 (1965); U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/S.R.2, at
12-13 (1965).
73 The Indian representative, for example, suggested that "it might be possible to
reach an agreement to the effect that the dispatch of armed personnel otherwise than
for the purpose of observation or investigation should be within the exclusive power
of the Security Council. A convention might then be established that where the parties
primarily concerned concurred the great powers might agree, save in exceptional circumstances or for special reasons, not to vote against a proposal involving the dispatch
of armed personnel." U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.., at 6 (1965).
The representative of Pakistan emphasized the relation of peace-keeping to the
peaceful settlement of disputes under Articles 33 and 34 of the Charter. "The problem
would be greatly simplified if the Security Council called upon the parties to a
dispute, not merely to negotiate, but to settle the dispute by other peaceful means,
such as inquiry, mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement which were mentioned
in Article 33, and if the Council carried out the investigative functions laid down in
Article 34 of the Charter. It was the disuse of those provisions of the Charter which
had necessitated the employment of the palliatives known since 1956 as 'peace-keeping
operations'--a rather loose term which might have caused some confusion. It leads
one to overlook the fact that those operations were different from the dispatch of a
military force with a coercive mission and that United Nations intervention in a
situation likely to lead to a breach of the peace might constitute nothing more than
either the employment of the peaceful means envisaged in Article 33, at the parties
own choice, or the taking of measures for the peaceful adjustment of the situation in
accordance with recommendations under Article 14. It had been repeatedly pointed
out that the scope of those operations was strictly limited because of their peaceful
and voluntary nature; they were undertaken at the request or with the consent of
the country involved; the use of force was barred except in self-defence; and they
placed no obligation on Member States to contribute to them in either personnel or
material." U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.6, at 5 (1965).
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that is Articles 41 to 47. It cannot be argued that what the Charter provides for in these Articles is only a combat use of these
armed forces, a use only in fighting operations. The enumeration of possible actions in Article 42 is exemplicative-I would
draw your attention to the words "may include"-and those
actions that are mentioned, such as demonstrations and blockades, are not fighting operations, not shooting operations. To
maintain that so-called police operations by armed forces are not
included under Article 42 seems to us not consistent with the
logic of the Charter. Neither does it make sense to us to hear
that so-called police operations cannot be considered as enforcement actions; for what is a police force for if not for enforcing
some behavior or dissuading from some activity? And moreover,
in all common sense, military forces, even when armed only with
conventional weapons, are certainly a formidable political instrument, especially when operating in a small or not heavily
armed country; and it is therefore necessary to use this instrument with the utmost caution and the highest degree of responsibility as strictly defined by the Charter. It is logical therefore
that such an instrument be created and manipulated by that
organ of the United Nations which has the exclusive competence
for using armed force as stipulated under the provisions of
74
Chapter VII.
The Soviet Union was equally explicit in rejecting the suggestion that
a Chapter VI or some other restricted definition of "peace-keeping operations" might provide a basis for compromising the financial impasse.
The Soviet representative restated the basic position of the U.S.S.R. on
the exclusive authority of the Security Council "on all basic issues relating to the creation, utilization and financing, in each individual case,
of the armed forces of the United Nations," and endorsed the statements
of France and Czechoslovakia. He then added a specific rejoinder to,
the proposals of Canada, Mexico and Sweden:
The Soviet delegation would wish, likewise, to express its view
with regard to one of the concepts that is being developed by
some delegations in our Committee too. This involves the assertion according to which the United Nations is within its right
to carry out such operations for the maintenance of peace as
distinct from enforcement action. Here, the very posing of the
question constitutes total confusion. It proceeds from the premise that some utilization of the armed forces or their dispatch
on behalf of the Organization can exist where such action would
not come under the effect of Chapter VII of the Charter of the
74 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/PV.3, at 46 (1965); U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.3, at
17 (1965).
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United Nations. And by way of a governing criterion in such a
posing of the problem, it is suggested that the agreement of the
country to which these troops are to be sent be secured. It
is stated that if such an agreement is secured, then if these troops
are sent there, the operations cannot be considered as one of
the measures connected with the utilization of enforcement
action. Such an operation apparently should be considered as
coming under the effect of Chapter VI and not Chapter VII of
the Charter.
None of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter shows any
signs that the measures included, aimed at the peaceful solution
of disputes, could include any action, such as an operation on
behalf of the United Nations, that might involve the use of
armed forces; and the agreement or disagreement of countries
that they should accept upon their territory the armed forces of
the United Nations cannot change the character of the operations themselves which, we repeat, lies in the utilization of the
armed forces of the United Nations, and on behalf of the United
Nations. The governing criterion here is the character of the
actions which may be reduced to using the armed forces only
in those instances where it is necessary to avert or to halt an act
of armed aggression against the territorial independence, integrity and sovereignty of the country concerned.
That is why the Soviet delegation fully and categorically rejects
any attempts to represent matters as if, on the basis of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, it is possible to take any
decisions involving the use of the armed forces on behalf of the
United Nations. 5
Some Tentative Speculations
So long as the Soviet bloc joined perhaps by France continues to be
anchored to this position, there is no possibility of an explicit compro75 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/PV.8, at 13-17 (1965). In responding to a comment by the
United States representative which relied in part on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Soviet representative also repeated the U.S.S.R.'s complete
rejection of that opinion with this explanation: "In drafting the Charter of the
United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, it was recognized that no United Nations
organ could give an interpretation of the United Nations Charter that would be
binding on Member States of the United Nations, and that if differences arose in
the interpretation of particular provisions of the Charter, those differences should
be overcome by appropriate amendment of the Charter in accordance with the procedure laid down for the purpose: in other words, through negotiation with a view .to
bringing about agreement. Accordingly, it is obvious that the interpretation of the
Charter given in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 20
July 1962 and in the General Assembly resolution of 19 December 1962 cannot bind
anyone to any course of action." Id. at 37.
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mise solution of the constitutional disagreement underlying the financial
crisis of the United Nations. 76 Furthermore, it is also apparent that the
Soviet Union's position is at war, not so much with the language of the
Charter, as with the experience which has molded its life-an experience
which the U.S.S.R. has itself either affirmatively shared, as in West
Irian, 77 or at least condoned, as in the case of UNEF. In other instances,
where the U.S.S.R. has affirmatively joined in authorizing peacekeeping operations through action by the Security Council-in the
76 Thus far the United States has not commented specifically on these attempts to
define "peace-keeping operations." The Working Paper submitted by the U.S. delegation, first to the Working Group of Twenty-One, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.113/30 (1965),
and recirculated to the Committee of Thirty-Three, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/3 (1965),
refers to "United Nations peacekeeping operations involving the use of military forces"
but does not otherwise define or limit such operations. It suggests as a guide to future
arrangements: "All proposals to initiate such peacekeeping operations would be considered first in the Security Council. The General Assembly would not authorize or
assume control of such peacekeeping operations unless the Council had demonstrated
that it was unable to take action." Id. at 3. Its more particular suggestions are concerned with the principles and methods of financing and apportioning the expenses of
such operations. However, the U.S. representative at the second meeting of the Committee of Thirty-Three did say: "The exclusive power given to the Security Council by
the Charter in this field is to decide on measures commonly called 'enforcement actions'
for the maintenance of international peace and security, decisions which are binding on
member states." U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/PV.2, at 55 (1965); U.N. Doc. No.
A/AC.121/SR.2, at 19 (1965).
It remains to be seen how, if at all, this affects the classic US. position as reflected in
the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Both the Indian and the Venezuelan representatives
concluded explicitly that all "enforcement action" was the exclusive province of the
Security Council and that the Uniting for Peace Resolution insofar as it suggested the
contrary was itself "unrealistic if not also improper" and contrary to the opinion of the
International Court of Justice. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.4, at 4 (1965); U.N.
Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.5, at 11 (1965). It is, of course, conceivable that a considerable sector of opinion in the United States would welcome such a qualification of our
Uniting for Peace position. See, e.g., 111 CONG. Rc. 5737-43 (daily ed. March 25, 1965)
(speech by Senator Aiken).
77 Particularly noteworthy is the vote on the resolution establishing UNTEA
(United Nations Temporary Executive Authority) for the administration and policing
of West New Guinea (West Irian). A/RES/1752 (XVII) (1962). It was adopted by
the General Assembly by a vote of 89 to none with 14 abstentions, and every
member of the Soviet bloc voted in favor of the resolution without a word of
protest. U.N. GEtN. Ass. OFF. REG. 17th Sess., Plenary 1127 (A/PV.1127) (1962). The
resolution provided for the establishment of a U.N. Civil Administration and Security
Force, operating conjointly with the Papuan police force and completely under the
authority of a United Nations Administrator who was in turn responsible directly to
the Secretary-General. This administration was notably temporary in character, pending
only complete transfer of authority to Indonesia. It was financed entirely by Indonesia
and the Netherlands, was based on an agreement between them, and represented an
arrangement eminently satisfactory to Indonesia. It has even been characterized as a
"face-saving" rather than a "peace-keeping" operation. See RussELL, UNIrD NATIONS
EXPERIENCE WITH MILITARY FORCES: PoLrrICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 126 (1963). Nevertheless, its actual authority during the period of its existence exceeded that of any
other U.N. peace-keeping operation. See Bowrr, op. cit. supra note 71, ch. 7.

1965]

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AT THE UN

Congo and more recently in Cyprus 7 8 -the constitutional controversy
is not so sharply drawn, partly because the great issue of "Security
Council vs. General Assembly" is not involved and partly because the
theoretical positions are not so clearly delineated. Thus the supporters
of peace-keeping operations like those in the Congo and Cyprus are not
agreed on what chapter (VI or VII) or on what particular article of
either chapter to invoke. The U.S.S.R. on the other hand is dear that
authority must be found in Chapter VII, but has difficulty in pointing
out where the actual practice departs from constitutional requirements.
One key to its position rests on an interpretation of Article 48 which
would deny to the Council any room for delegating to the SecretaryGeneral authority to make the practical arrangements for the assembling
of United Nations forces. Yet this interpretation is plainly at variance
with the Resolutions for which the U.S.S.R. has voted both in the case
of the Congo and of Cyprus and is not even supported by textual
analysis.
Assuming then that the United Nations is not to turn its back on the
whole thrust of its historical development in this area, the question remains whether it is wise to attempt to define more explicitly than has so
far been collectively attempted both the nature of the peace-keeping
operations at issue and the exact source of their authority. The principal
advantage apparently anticipated from a more precise definition of
"peace-keeping" is that it may reduce the area of great power concern
over possible usurpation of their prerogatives and make agreement easier;
the principal disadvantage is that a definition formulated primarily in
terms of past experience and tailored towards a solution of the present
controversy might turn out to be an embarrassing limitation on the flexi78 The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established by the Security
Council Resolution of March 4, 1964, for a period of three months. U.N. Doc. No.
S/5575 (1964). It has been extended for similar periods on several successive occasions.
The operative language of the resolution "recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus.
The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary General, in
consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom." The resolution also "recommends that the function of the force should be, in
the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to
prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance
and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." Costs are to be
met by the governments providing contingents, by the Government of Cyprus, and by
voluntary contributions which the Secretary-General is authorized to accept. The
Soviet Union objected to those provisions of the resolution which authorized the
Secretary-General to determine the composition of the Force as a circumvention of the
Security Council and asked for a separate vote on that part of the resolution. It then
abstained in the actual vote, together with France and Czechoslovakia, so that the
paragraph was adopted by 8 votes to none. The resolution as a whole was then adopted
unanimously. U.N. Doc. No. S/PV.1102 (1964).
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bility required for meeting future crises. The considerations involved in
weighing the respective advantages and disadvantages might be epitomized by reference to the problems of consent of the host state and the
appropriate functions of the force. In each of the past peace-keeping
operations involving substantial use of United Nations forces-UNEF in
the Middle East, ONUC in the Congo, UNTEA in West New Guinea and
UNFICYP in Cyprus-the forces were introduced with the general consent of all the contending parties and with the specific consent of the state
upon whose territory the force was to be stationed. This does not mean,
however, that the scope of consent was entirely without its problems.
Israel, for example, refused consent to the stationing of UNEF on its territory, and the revocable or irrevocable nature of Egypt's consent was the
subject of delicate negotiations between the Secretary-General and the
Egyptian government which eventuated in the adoption of a formula
appropriately shrouded in masterful ambiguity.79 Similar problems arise
in attempting to define the functions of the force. ONUC was bedeviled throughout a large part of its history by the question whether
it was an appropriate part of its functions to assist the Central Government in compelling Katanga to abandon secession.8 0 Theoretically the
Force was never used for this purpose, although it is hardly doubtful
that ONUC's eventual vigorous exercise of the right of "self-defense"
in vindication of its right of "freedom of movement" contributed materially to the collapse of Katanga's secession. 8 '
79 See BowET,

op. cit. supra note 71, at 124-25; GROSS, THE UNrrai

NATIONS:

STRucrURE FOR PEACE 30-33 (1962); Schachter, supra note 71, at 210-11; U.N. GEN. Ass.

OFF. REG. l1th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, at 9-10 (A/3375) (1956).
s0 Particularly pertinent were certain basic guiding principles drawn by the Secretary-General from the experience of the UNEF: "[T]he United Nations activity should
have freedom of movement within its area of operations and all such facilities regarding access to that area and communications as are necessary for the successful completion of the task . . . . The Force should not be used to enforce specific political
solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a
solution." And "the men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the
use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms,
including attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions which they
occupy under orders from the Commander, acting under the authority of the Assembly
and within the scope of its resolutions." See Report of the Secretary-General, supra
note 55, at 29, 30, 167, 179, respectively. Compare O'BRIEN, To KATANGA AND BACK:
A U.N. CASE HISTORY (1962). See also Note by the Secretary-General: Aide memoire
concerning some questions relating to the functions and operation of the United
Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. U.N. Doc. No. S/5653 (1964).
81 See HOSKINS, THE CONGO SINCE INDEPENDENCE 447-55 (1964); LEFEVER, CRISIS IN
THE CONGO ch. 3 (1965). At this point a new resolution had authorized "the Secretary-

General to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force,
if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action, and/or
deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers
not under the United Nations Command and mercenaries as laid down in part A,
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Does this experience suggest that the attempt to define precisely "peacekeeping operations" is a way of robbing the future to serve the immediate
present? Probably the only sensible answer to this question must be
sought in just how precise the definition is to be, how much it will help
to solve the present crisis, and how much it will appear to bind the
future. At the present stage of developments the following general definition or statement of principle might be hazarded as being in accord with
foreseeable realities as well as past practices: peace-keeping forces may
not be introduced into a dispute or threatening situation without the
general consent of all the immediate parties and without the specific
consent of the state upon whose territory they were to be stationed, and
82
they may not be used for purposes of coercion against any state.
A more ambitious definition, delineating the appropriate functions of
such forces and wrestling specifically with such administrative concepts
as the right of self-defense and freedom of movement, seems likely to open
up a Pandora's box of difficult questions hardly susceptible of abstract
83
solution.
operative paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1961."
U.N. Srcumry CoUNcIL OFF. REc. 16th year, Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1961, at 148-49 (S/5002)
(1961).
82 It has been suggested, however, that consent may not always be required from the
host state for the conduct of peace-keeping operations on its territory when they are
authorized by the Security Council and when there has been an express or implied
finding under Article 39 of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression. See Bowrr, op. cit. supra note 71, at 413-17. This view assumes that peacekeeping operations more limited than enforcement action under Article 42 may be
authorized by a decision of the Security Council under some other provision of Chapter
VII and that members are thus obliged to accept and carry them out as provided in
Article 25 and 49. This point illustrates one of the risks involved in accepting the
Canadian suggestion that all "peace-keeping operations" as distinguished from "enforcement" measures are Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII.
83 The representative of Nigeria in the Committee of Thirty-Three made some
interesting observations on the special meaning that might be attributed to selfdefence: "The important question obviously was whether one should rule out all use
of force, in any form, in the implementing of measures for the pacific settlement of
a dispute. His delegation would answer that question in the negative. The use of
'incidental' force might be unavoidable in certain circumstances. Clearly, much must
depend on the type of force contemplated. In his own country, a police force was
regarded as a peace force, since Nigerian policemen bore arms only in an emergency
and were in that case authorized to use them only in order to prevent a felonious
breach of peace and to the extent justified by the circumstances. The use of policemen to patrol a cease-fire line or to help a country to maintain internal law and order
in an emergency could, and should, be regarded as legitimate action under the
Charter's Chapter VI. Since, however, that Chapter only provided for the formulation
of recommendations, such a force could be dispatched only at the request, or with the
consent, of the countries concerned. Such a police force should not bear arms unless
the circumstances patently so required, and it should not be authorized to use those
arms except in self-defence or with a view to preventing a felonious breach of law
and order. Finally, the United Nations should exercise the utmost caution in acceding
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Neither does it seem important to choose among Articles 10, 11 and 14
in seeking specific authority of the General Assembly to initiate peacekeeping operations of the limited character under consideration. All of
these Articles may be regarded as relevant, and the authority may properly be regarded as a composite implication from all of them. The more
substantial question is whether the careful repetition in all of these
articles of the w6rd "recommend" and the omission of any words such
as "authorize" or "establish" constitutes a positive bar to the General
Assembly's authorizing the Secretary-General to establish and direct a
United Nations Force consisting of units voluntarily contributed by
Member states. This problem is not peculiar to peace-keeping operations.
The functions of the Secretariat are not spelled out in terms of each of
the objectives of the Charter, except insofar as Article 99 explicitly provides that "the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." Otherwise the permissible
scope of the Secretary-General's authority must be derived from the provision of Article 97 that he shall be "the chief administrative officer
of the Organization"; the provision of Article 98 that he "shall perform
such other functions as are entrusted to him by" the General Assembly,
Security Council, Economic and Social Council and Trusteeship Council; and the provision of Article 101 that the "staff shall be appointed
by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General
Assembly." Although, for example, the appropriate role of the SecretaryGeneral in achieving the objectives of Chapter X, "International, Economic and Social Cooperation," is not even mentioned in that Chapter,
the Secretariat has been entrusted with the administration under various
types of Committee supervision of United Nations funds voluntarily contributed by Member states and others for the purposes of economic development.8 4 This administration now constitutes a very substantial part
of the executive responsibilities of the Secretariat. Like peace-keeping
operations this development of executive responsibility for economic
development may not have been foreseen by the framers of the Charter
to a request for assistance in the maintenance of internal law and order, and should

grant such assistance only on terms which ensured that the Organization's aid would
not be abused in the interest of maintaining a status quo unacceptable to the majority
of the population. The Committee should attempt to define clearly the circumstances
and conditions in which such aid might be given." U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.5,
at 5 (1965).
84 The two principal programs are the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance,
established in accordance with Economic and Social Council A/Res/22A(IX) (1949),

as approved by A/Res/304(IV) (1949), and the Special Fund, established by A/Res/1240(XIII) (1958). For the background of the establishment of the Special Fund see HADWEN

& KAUFMAN,

How UNrrIED NATIONs DECIsIONs ARE MADE (1960).
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and is certainly not foreshadowed by any explicit provision of the
Charter. Yet its constitutional legitimacy is unanimously accepted. Apart
from the arguments based on the "primary responsibility of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security," there
is no more reason to doubt the legitimacy of the delegation to the Secretariat of authority for the administration of peace-keeping operations.8 5
When such operations are authorized by the Security Council rather
than the General Assembly, the question of their exact constitutional
basis and the problem of delegation of authority have other connotations.
As has already been indicated, it is difficult to take seriously the Soviet
Union's insistence that under Article 48 the Council itself must determine which members are to carry out the decisions of the Council and
may not delegate any responsibility to the Secretary-General. There is
perhaps more ground for uneasiness created by the fact that Article 43
is so explicit in providing that agreements "shall be concluded between
the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and
groups of Members" governing the contribution of "armed forces, assistance, and facilities for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security." In order to avoid these specifics of Article 43 as well as the
provisions of Article 47 for the direction of armed forces by the Military
Staff Committee,8 6 there has been a natural tendency to look for other
specific provisions authorizing peace-keeping operations of a different
character. As has already been noted, during the Congo operations the
Secretary-General suggested the possible application of Article 40, which
authorizes the Security Council to "call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable." This suggestion is, however, highly artificial as applied to a situa85 See STONE, Legal Bases for Establishment of Forces Performing United Nations
Security Functions, PEAcE KEEING, EXPERIENCE AND EVALUATION 277 (Frydenberg ed.
1964); Stein, Mr. Hammarskfold, the CharterLaw and the Future Role of the United
Nations Secretary General, 56 Am. J. INT'L. 9 (1962). The argument developed in
the text on the delegation of authority to the Secretary-General does not necessarily
answer the original French position on the constitutional requirement of voluntary as
distinguished from compulsory financing. This will be discussed in the third part of
this article to appear in Volume 33 of the University of Chicago Law Review.
86 The Military Staff Committee has been quiescent ever since its fundamental disagreement on all crucial issues in April, 1947. See YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS
1946-47, at 424-43 (1947); RussELL, op. cit. supra note 77, at 12-18. At the second meeting of the Committee of Thirty-Three the Soviet representative made some specific suggestions for the reactivation of the Military Staff Committee which apparently aroused
some interest. "He strongly recommended that a large number of States-not only the
non-permanent members of the Security Council but also States which could provide
contingents and other facilities for the United Nations operations-should take part
in its work, the purpose of which was to assist the Security Council in all questions
relating to the -use of armed forces by the United Nations." U.N. Doc. No.
A/AC.121/SR.2, at 6 (1965). Apparently these suggestions have not been made in the
Military Staff Committee itself.
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tion like the Congo. s7 In its general context Article 40 suggests that the
provisional measures contemplated are preliminary steps pending ultimate resolution. Although ONUC was, of course, intended to be temporary in duration, it was also designed to solve the particular difficulty
or threat to the peace with which the Council was concerned, i.e., the
intervention of foreign forces and the breakdown of internal security in
the Congo. In the Cyprus situation the term "provisional" would seem
to have a happier application, since the United Nations obviously wants
to find a more lasting solution than can be achieved through peacekeeping operations, a concern indicated by the concurrent appointment
of a mediator.
As was mentioned earlier, the Canadian delegation has suggested
Chapter VI as an alternative basis for peace-keeping authorized by either
the Security Council or the General Assembly. This suggestion has the
advantage of separating the entire process from the compulsory atmosphere of Chapter VII. It also draws upon the broad language of
Articles 34 and 35 which permit the Security Council or the General
Assembly to consider any dispute or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute. It would also presumably
rely upon Article 36 authorizing the Security Council to "recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment." In this respect it
would emphasize the non-compulsory characterization of the type of
action involved. It would equate the type of action which the Security
Council might take with the kind of "measures" which the Assembly
might recommend under Article 14, and would include peace-keeping
operations with various other types of voluntary, noncoercive methods
87 Bowett at one point seems to share this dissatisfaction with the applicability of
Article 40 to the Congo situation: "Hence Article 40, coupled with the power to establish subsidiary organs in Article 29, affords a satisfactory basis for the Force, rather
in the way in which these two provisions of the Charter provided a basis for certain
of the observer groups which the Council has established. The present writer's difficulty in accepting this as a complete answer to the question of the constitutional
basis of ONUC is that, whilst the supervision of compliance with the call for provisional measures was a major part of ONUC's function, it was not the entire function:
it is for this reason that a somewhat broader basis in Article 39 is preferred." Bow=rr,
op. cit. supra note 71, at 178. He states the broader basis as follows: "Our conclusion
is, therefore, that the establishment of ONUC was by Resolution of the Security
Council to achieve the general purpose of the Organization set out in Article I (1), in
fulfilment of the Council's 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security,' conferred by Article 24; and that, having made an implicit finding under Article 39, the Council acted under Chapter VII of the Charter so as to
establish a United Nations Force for the purpose of supervising and enforcing compliance with the provisional measures ordered under Article 40 and for other purposes
consistent with the general powers of the Council under Article 39." Id. at 180. Later
on, however, Bowett seems to find Article 40 more completely satisfactory both as
regards ONUC in particular and the establishment of U.N. forces generally. Id. at
282-83.
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of settling disputes or ameliorating dangerous situations, such as mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, truce supervision, and observation.8 8 This
may, of course, tend to downgrade peace-keeping as an effective weapon
in the arsenal of the United Nations, but it might also be said that a
downgraded weapon is better than no weapon at all.
Despite these attractive features of the Swedish-Canadian exclusive
reliance upon Chapter VI, it seems on balance an unfortunate commitment. Experience indicates that peace-keeping operations do not fit neatly
into any one particular slot. Even in the same operation a fluid situation may seem to point at different times to different provisions of the
Charter as the most suitable and convenient for the purposes at hand.
Schachter tells us, for example, that early in the Congo operations the
Secretary-General was particularly anxious to assume that the Security
Council had acted under Chapter VII rather than under Chapter VI because he "believed that emphasis on the mandatory effect of the Security
Council decision would reduce resistance by Belgians and Katangese"
and that "in fact subsequent reports from Brussels indicated that this
legal point carried weight within the Government."8 9 Later the SecretaryGeneral, when he was more concerned to exclude Article 42 as a possible
basis for coercion against Katanga, pointed out that neither the Council
nor the General Assembly had ever explicitly endorsed his interpretation
of an implied finding under Article 39 of Chapter VII.90 These are of
course quite speculative considerations, but it is equally speculative to
assume that the Russians or French would be any more willing to accept
compulsory financing of peace-keeping operations baptised under Chapter VI than they would similar operations justified under Chapter VII.
Certainly the preliminary debate in the Committee of Thirty-Three
affords scant hope of much progress in that direction. On the other hand,
88 In this connection it is interesting to compare UNOGIL (The United Nations
Observer Group in Lebanon) with UNEF in its authorization and functions. It was
established by a Security Council resolution which decided "to dispatch urgently
an observation group to proceed to the Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal
infiltration of personnel or supply or arms or other material across the Lebanese

borders" and authorized "the Secretary General to take the necessary steps to that
end." U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 13th year, Supp. April-June 1958, at 47
(S/4023) (1958). This action never gave rise to constitutional or financial objections,
although at its height UNOGIL included over 600 personnel. See RUSSFLL, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 71-79; BowETr, op. cit. supra note 71, at 64-65. In the Summary study of the
experience derived from the establishment and experience of the force (UNEF), supra

note 55, at 30, the Secretary-General suggested that UNOGIL was established by the
Security Council under Chapter VI and that "a similar action obviously could
have been taken by the General Assembly under Article 22." Stone questions whether
there was any real distinction in functions between UNEF and an observer group.

STONE, op. cit. supra note 85, at 288.
89 Schachter, supra note 71, at 218.

90 See statement of Secretary-General quoted supra note 71.
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that same debate may reflect a little too much anxiety, borne of the
frustrations of the current session, to de-emphasize all mandatory aspects
of the peace-keeping operations under consideration with the hope of
making them more palatable to all concerned. Certainly it would be unfortunate if the Committee were to commit itself to a view of the Charter
which inhibits future growth and even disowns past experience without
achieving in return any substantial progress towards acceptance of that
collective financial responsibility which is the avowed objective of most
of its Members. 91
91 On June 15, 1965, the Committee of Thirty-Three reported to the General
Assembly that it had come "to the conclusion that more time is required to complete
the consideration of the matters covered by its mandate from the General Assembly
and has decided to continue its work." In addition to a history of its proceedings, the
closest the Committee came to a substantive recommendation was the statement that
its members were "agreed that the United Nations should be strengthened through
a co-operative effort and that the General Assembly when it reconvenes must conduct
its work according to the normal procedure established by its rules of procedure."
Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, U.N. Doc. No. A/5915
at 4 (1965). The report also appended as Annex II a more analytical summary
of the issues contained in a Report of the Secretary-General and the President of the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.121/SR.4 (1965).

